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ABSTRACT
The paper ﬁ  rst reviews the main drivers of the 
growth and real convergence process in central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe (CESEE) 
since 2000 and assesses the key macro-ﬁ  nancial 
strengths and vulnerabilities of the region at the 
beginning of the global economic and ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. The main part of the paper reviews 
ﬁ   nancial and real economic developments 
in these countries since the crisis started to 
impact the CESEE region. The paper ﬁ  nds that 
developments have been rather heterogeneous 
in the region. CESEE countries with the 
largest economic imbalances tended to be most 
affected. National and international support 
measures appear to have helped to stabilise 
ﬁ  nancial markets, and parent banks of foreign 
bank subsidiaries in CESEE were committed 
to sustaining their exposure to the region. The 
degree to which CESEE governments were 
able to use policy instruments to counter the 
real effects of the crisis is rather heterogeneous, 
depending inter alia on the exchange rate regime 
in place and the initial ﬁ  scal positions.
Keywords: Financial crisis, vulnerability 
indicators, central, eastern and south-eastern 
Europe.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: F15, F32, G01, G15, G18, 
H30.5
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The paper looks at the impact of the global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis on a number of 
central, eastern and south-eastern European 
(CESEE) countries. More speciﬁ  cally, we are 
looking at those CESEE economies that became 
Member States of the European Union (EU) 
in 2004 and 2007, but which have not yet 
adopted the euro. In addition, we have included 
Croatia in our analysis, given its fairly advanced 
stage of membership negotiations with the EU.
Before the crisis, the CESEE region was 
experiencing an economic boom with rapid 
GDP and credit growth, which in turn beneﬁ  ted 
from strong global growth and easy liquidity 
conditions. In addition, economic growth in the 
region was underpinned by positive expectations 
for EU convergence and euro adoption. 
Until the ﬁ   nal quarter of 2008, the CESEE 
region was remarkably resilient to the global 
economic and ﬁ   nancial crisis. This is partly 
due to the fact that the region had no or 
only negligible exposures to subprime or 
subprime-related assets. However, part of this 
resilience can also be explained with standard 
vulnerability indicators, which at the onset of the 
crisis indicated in several dimensions a stronger 
position of the region compared with previous 
crises. The main exceptions were the heightened 
external and banking vulnerabilities, precisely 
two areas that proved particularly sensitive 
in the context of the global crisis.
From September 2008, however, the global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis gained markedly 
in depth and intensity, and waning foreign 
investor conﬁ  dence towards emerging markets 
quickly dashed hopes of a possible decoupling 
of the CESEE region from the global turmoil. 
As a result, CESEE was hit hard, in many 
respects even harder than other emerging market 
regions such as Latin America. Developments 
have, however, not been homogenous in the 
region. Countries in central and eastern Europe 
(CEE) tended to be hit less seriously than those 
in the Baltics or south-eastern Europe (SEE), 
suggesting that countries with rather pronounced 
vulnerabilities and a higher degree of ﬁ  nancial 
integration tended to be affected more severely.
Looking at the impact on different ﬁ  nancial 
market segments, exchange rates were strongly 
affected, stock markets piled up huge losses and 
bond spreads as well as risk premia increased to 
elevated levels, while becoming more volatile. 
The crisis also had a major impact on capital 
ﬂ  ows to the region, although the magnitude of 
the impact differed again notably, depending 
on the type of capital inﬂ  ow and the receiving 
country. Despite some temporary capital 
outﬂ   ows, the worst-case scenario of a fully 
ﬂ  edged  ﬁ   nancial meltdown did not occur. In 
particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inﬂ   ows and inter-company loans played an 
important role in stabilising capital ﬂ  ows to the 
region, but the region’s strong integration into 
European banking networks turned out to be 
an asset during the crisis too. CESEE banking 
sectors experienced a strong deceleration in 
credit and deposit growth, while banks in the 
region have become confronted with an – 
in some countries substantial – increase in 
non-performing loans and a decline in 
proﬁ   tability. Nevertheless, banking sector 
capitalisation remained at high levels.
The disruptions in domestic and international 
ﬁ   nancial markets, together with the real 
channels of transmission such as the plunge in 
global trade ﬂ  ows, also had a very pronounced 
effect on real economic developments from late 
2008 onwards, ultimately resulting in severe 
recessions in most countries in the region. The 
length and depth of the resulting economic 
downturn cannot be predicted with accuracy. 
Future domestic demand will depend inter alia 
on the success of private debt restructuring 
and the willingness of the ﬁ   nancial sector to 
continue lending. Net exports will depend on 
future foreign demand and on CESEE countries’ 
relative external competitiveness. Given the 
lack of nominal exchange rate ﬂ  exibility, the 6
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ﬁ  xed exchange rate CESEE countries may ﬁ  nd 
strengthening their competitiveness somewhat 
more challenging than the countries with ﬂ  oating 
nominal exchange rates.
The policy response to the crisis in the CESEE 
countries focused on standard and non-standard 
monetary policy action as well as ﬁ  scal 
measures. Standard monetary policy remained 
very cautious in most countries until the end of 
2008 when the severity of the recession became 
clear and most CESEE countries embarked on 
a process of monetary easing. In most CESEE 
countries, however, policy rates remain at higher 
levels than in major industrialised economies. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, CESEE 
authorities have also taken a range of 
non-standard policy measures to stabilise 
ﬁ   nancial markets and reduce spillovers to 
the real economy. Fiscal policy responses to 
the crisis varied within the region and were 
mainly determined by the ﬁ   scal situation at 
the beginning of the crisis. Overall, the various 
national and – in some cases – international 
(e.g. IMF, EU) support measures appear to 
have helped to cushion the impact of the global 
economic and ﬁ   nancial crisis on the CESEE 
countries.7
ECB
Occasional Paper No 114
June 2010
I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
The paper analyses the impact of the global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis on a number of 
central, eastern and south-eastern European 
(CESEE) countries. More speciﬁ  cally, we are 
looking at those CESEE economies which are 
Member States of the EU, but have not yet 
adopted the euro (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). In addition, we have included Croatia 
in our analysis, given its fairly advanced stage 
of membership negotiations with the EU.1
When assessing the impact of the global 
economic and ﬁ   nancial crisis on the CESEE 
region, it is important to recall two important 
aspects that distinguish this region from other 
emerging market regions.2 First, the countries in 
this region went through a deep and historically 
unprecedented transformation process from 
planned to market economies. This implied 
the need to undertake signiﬁ  cant  investments 
in physical as well as human capital within 
a short period of time, as the pre-transition 
physical capital stock had become largely 
obsolete after the regime change. In addition, 
the transition process implied manifold 
changes in the economic integration pattern of 
CESEE, including substantial trade deepening 
(see Chart 1) and an almost complete redirection 
of international trade ﬂ   ows. The regional 
reorientation of trade ﬂ   ows towards the EU 
went hand in hand with structural changes 
involving a shift from resource-based/low-tech
exports to medium- and high-tech exports 
(see Chart 2). This shift helped the CESEE 
countries (being net importers of raw materials 
and energy) to successfully cope with the negative 
terms-of-trade shock resulting from the global 
commodity price boom before the global crisis.
The issue of regional trade reorientation is 
closely related to the second key distinguishing 
These countries can be divided into three geographical sub-regions, 1 
namely the central and eastern European (CEE) countries 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the south-eastern 
European (SEE) countries Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and 
the Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
On this issue, see also Martin and Winkler (2009). 2 
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feature of the CESEE economies, namely 
their participation in the European integration 
process. Except for Croatia – which is expected 
to join the EU in the coming years – all CESEE 
countries under review have become members of 
the EU, an economic area with highly integrated 
goods, services, capital and (to a lesser extent) 
labour markets, and have adopted European 
standards for economic policy, institutions and 
governance. Moreover, all CESEE countries 
Chart 2 Technological content of exports
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I   INTRODUCTION
are sooner or later set to adopt the euro and 
are thus committed to striving towards the 
fulﬁ  lment of the convergence criteria laid down 
in the EU Treaty (ECB, 2003). During the 
period of buoyant growth until 2008, ﬁ  nancial 
vulnerabilities built up in some, but not all, 
CESEE countries. Policy stances differed 
across countries, while the policy toolbox 
(e.g. as regards the management of capital ﬂ  ows) 
was constrained by EU accession and the depth 
of  ﬁ   nancial integration, which has increased 
considerably over the last decade, not least in 
terms of cross-border ownership of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (see Chart 3).
Against this background, this paper ﬁ  rst reviews 
the main drivers of the growth and real 
convergence process in the CESEE countries 
since 2000. In doing so, it focuses in particular on 
the role of the ﬁ   nancial sector and reviews 
the resulting macro-ﬁ   nancial strengths and 
vulnerabilities of the region at the onset of 
the global economic and ﬁ   nancial crisis. This 
provides the background for the main part of 
the paper, which reviews ﬁ   nancial and real 
economic developments in CESEE since the 
onset of the crisis. This part of the paper also 
reviews the national and international policy 
responses undertaken so far in order to cope with 
the spillovers of the global crisis. The ﬁ  nal section 
of the paper presents the main conclusions.3
Given the small country sample, we do not attempt to explain  3 
empirically the cross-country differences in the severity of 
the crisis impact. Examples of such analyses, based on larger 
country samples, are Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) and Rose 
and Spiegel (2010). Whereas the former paper identiﬁ  es inter alia 
the pre-crisis level of development, the buoyancy of economic 
activity and credit, external vulnerabilities and openness to trade 
as important determinants for the intensity of the crisis, the latter 
paper does not ﬁ  nd a link between the commonly cited causes of 
the crisis and its cross-country impact.10
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2  MAIN DRIVERS OF GROWTH AND REAL 
CONVERGENCE BEFORE THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS
2.1  STYLISED FACTS ON GROWTH 
AND CONVERGENCE TRENDS 4
Following the end of central planning, output 
initially collapsed throughout the CESEE region. 
By the mid-1990s, however, real GDP growth 
resumed in all countries, reﬂ  ecting  mainly 
macroeconomic stabilisation and a wide range of 
structural reforms. For a number of reasons, real 
GDP growth further accelerated in most CESEE 
countries at the beginning of the new millennium.5 
First, macroeconomic stabilisation and structural 
reforms favoured, inter alia, sizeable FDI 
inﬂ   ows, the recovery of domestic investment 
and productivity growth. Second, lower (global) 
interest rates and the rapid development of 
ﬁ   nancial sectors supported domestic demand. 
Finally, the prospect of EU accession required 
the implementation of signiﬁ   cant legal and 
institutional reforms and spurred further trade 
and ﬁ  nancial integration with the EU.
The strong growth performance of CESEE led 
to some progress in real convergence, deﬁ  ned 
here as per capita income levels in PPP terms 
(see Chart 4). In most “ﬁ  xers”, i.e. countries 
whose nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
euro is completely ﬁ   xed or tightly managed 
(Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Croatia), 
per capita income almost doubled between 
2000 and 2008. The increase in income levels 
in most “ﬂ  oaters”, i.e. countries with ﬂ  oating 
exchange rates (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania) was less impressive than 
in the “ﬁ  xers” (except for Romania). Overall, 
as claimed by standard economic convergence 
See ECB (2009a) for a review of economic developments in  4 
the CESEE EU Member States since their accession in 2004 
and 2007. 
This section of the paper partly draws on Arratibel et al. (2007)  5 
as well as Morgese Borys, Polgár and Zlate (2009), who provide 
more detailed analyses of the growth and convergence process 
in CESEE.
Chart 4 GDP growth and GDP per capita 
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theory, countries with the lowest income levels 
at the beginning of the observation period made 
most progress in real convergence since 2000. 
In order to better understand the growth and 
convergence pattern of CESEE economies, we 
look in more detail at the drivers of growth. We 
ﬁ  rst look at the relative importance of changes in 
total factor productivity (TFP), capital and labour. 
Second, we look at the different components of 
GDP growth to see whether growth was mainly 
driven by domestic or foreign demand.
The production function approach to growth 
assumes that output depends on total factor 
productivity, the capital stock and labour.6 
Arratibel et al. (2007) ﬁ  nd that between 1996 
and 2005 TFP growth made a very signiﬁ  cant 
contribution to GDP growth in almost all CESEE 
countries. The strong role of TFP growth is 
intuitive. The transition process – involving 
privatisation, higher competition, deregulation 
in product and labour markets, opening up to 
international trade and FDI, technology transfer, 
etc. – resulted in a more efﬁ  cient use of input 
factors and better managerial practices, which 
are captured by TFP. By contrast, the contribution 
of labour to GDP growth was for most CESEE 
countries very modest or even negative.7
Turning to the main components of GDP 
growth, i.e. consumption, gross ﬁ  xed  capital 
formation (GFCF) and net exports, there are 
some important differences between the various 
CESEE countries (see Chart 5). Until 2008, 
net exports had an increasingly negative impact 
A weakness of this analytical approach is the absence of reliable  6 
and comparable data on capital stocks in CESEE countries. 
Therefore, they are approximated using the perpetual inventory 
method (see Arratibel et al., 2007, p. 11).
The contributions by capital and labour may be somewhat  7 
underestimated, for instance due to unregistered employment. 
The above ﬁ  ndings are broadly conﬁ  rmed by other production 
function analyses for CESEE countries (e.g. European 
Commission, 2004, and IMF, 2006).
Chart 5 GDP growth and its components
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on growth in the “ﬁ  xers” (except Croatia) and 
in Romania, whereas private consumption 
tended to make a positive contribution in almost 
all CESEE countries between 2000 and 2008 
(except Hungary and Croatia). A broadly similar 
pattern can be observed for GFCF, although 
the pattern is in many CESEE countries less 
pronounced than for private consumption.
In sum, the key cross-country features of the 
CESEE growth process prior to the economic 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis are the increasingly negative 
contribution of net exports to growth, especially 
in the “ﬁ  xers”, and the increasing contributions 
of private consumption and – less so – GFCF. 
Although these developments are in principle 
consistent with a maturing economic cycle, they 
implied that in most CESEE countries economic 
growth prior to the impact of the global economic 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis was predominantly based on 
private domestic demand. This growth pattern 
changed fundamentally when the crisis hit the 
region in 2008 (see Section 3.2).
2.2  THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that 
rapid ﬁ  nancial sector development played a key 
role in the CESEE growth and convergence 
experience. We ﬁ  rst look brieﬂ  y at international 
aspects of ﬁ   nancial sector development in 
the region, in particular the import of foreign 
capital. This is followed by a short discussion 
of domestic aspects of the region’s ﬁ  nancial 
deepening process, which was largely driven by 
rapid ﬁ  nancial integration.
2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Economic theory suggests that capital should 
ﬂ   ow “downhill”, i.e. from relatively capital-
intensive economies to relatively less capital-
intensive economies, given that the marginal 
return on capital is expected to be larger in 
the latter parts of the world. During the last 
couple of years the CESEE countries were 
good examples of emerging market economies 
which imported large amounts of capital to 
ﬁ  nance their growth and convergence process 
(see Abiad, Leigh and Mody, 2007).
In the CESEE countries, the academic and 
policy debate on capital inﬂ  ows tended to be 
less sceptical about the risk of strong capital 
inﬂ  ows than in other emerging market regions 
such as Latin America (von Hagen and 
Siedschlag, 2008), as it was strongly conditioned 
by EU accession. First and foremost, this process 
implied the need to lift all capital controls at the 
latest at the time of accession to the EU. 
In addition, the accession process resulted in a 
range of institutional provisions that arguably 
fostered capital inﬂ  ows (Lane, 2008). Moreover, 
the region’s increasing ﬁ  nancial integration with 
the rest of the EU, in particular the widespread 
foreign ownership of CESEE banking sectors, 
also contributed to these inﬂ  ows and played an 
important role in boosting credit growth and 
fuelling the boom before the crisis.8
There are some further reasons for the more 
positive attitude towards capital inﬂ  ows  in 
CESEE countries. First, a relatively large share 
of capital inﬂ  ows were FDI, which is seen as 
less volatile and more beneﬁ  cial for economic 
development than short-term, speculative 
capital ﬂ  ows (Abiad, Leigh and Mody, 2007). 
Second, unlike other emerging market regions 
(e.g. Latin America), the CESEE region had 
less experience with large-scale capital inﬂ  ows, 
including their negative side effects such as 
asset price booms, sudden stops in capital ﬂ  ows 
and capital outﬂ  ows. 
Given the institutional requirements of EU 
integration and the rather positive assessment of 
the economic impact of capital inﬂ  ows, CESEE 
central banks seem to have been less active in 
directly managing capital inﬂ  ows.  However, 
most CESEE central banks took measures to 
rein in overall credit growth and/or the growth 
in foreign currency-denominated credit, which 
was increasingly ﬁ  nanced by capital inﬂ  ows into 
the region, as the buoyant growth phase went 
on. Measures included increases in the reserve 
requirements, administrative measures and 
prudential measures including credit ceilings 
See also Herrmann and Winkler (2008), Berglöf et al. (2009), EBRD  8 
(2009), ECB (2009b), as well as Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010).13
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and a tightening of provisioning requirements. 
However, such measures often had only limited 
and at best temporary effects in achieving 
the desired results. Finally, some CESEE 
countries used ﬁ  scal policies to partly offset the 
expansionary macroeconomic effects of capital 
inﬂ  ows. Overall, however, ﬁ  scal tightening was 
relatively limited in most countries (von Hagen 
and Siedschlag, 2008), although also on this 
account considerable cross-country variation is 
to be noted.
The above-mentioned rapid GDP growth, 
which was strongly – and increasingly – based 
on domestic demand and ﬁ   nanced by capital 
inﬂ   ows, resulted in large external imbalances 
in most CESEE countries except for the Czech 
Republic and Poland. In fact, during the 2006-
08 period many CESEE countries ran current 
account deﬁ   cits well above 10% of GDP 
(see Chart 6).
At the same time, the role of FDI inﬂ  ows was 
signiﬁ   cant in all CESEE countries. In the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria, FDI 
inﬂ   ows even exceeded the current account 
deﬁ  cits, and in Romania and Croatia they covered 
a very large part of the current account deﬁ  cit. 
However, cross-border borrowing by banks 
and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations has also played 
an important role in ﬁ  nancing the catching-up
process in many CESEE economies. Other 
forms of capital imports, in particular portfolio 
investments, which are seen as rather volatile 
capital  ﬂ   ows, were in recent years, however, 
relatively less important in the CESEE countries 
under review. 
2.2.2 DOMESTIC FINANCIAL ASPECTS
The largely capital import-based growth model 
of the CESEE region was closely intertwined 
with a rapid ﬁ  nancial deepening process. In fact, 
in light of the inefﬁ   ciencies and distortions 
characterising CESEE banking markets during 
the early/mid-1990s 9 and the increasing ﬁ  scal 
constraints on dealing with troubled banks, the 
See Barisitz and Gardó (2009). 9 
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need for a more radical reform approach became 
evident in all CESEE countries by the mid-/
end-1990s. Thus, the authorities in most 
countries took the decision to open up their 
banking sectors to foreign strategic investors, in 
order to attract missing know-how, technology 
and capital, as well as to raise banks’ corporate 
governance, efﬁ   ciency and competitiveness. 
Given the huge untapped catching-up and proﬁ  t 
potential and the progress made in EU 
integration, foreign investors started to enter 
CESEE banking markets on a large scale at the 
turn of the millennium, with Austrian, German, 
Italian and French investors taking the lead. 
By year-end 2008 foreign banks held market 
shares well above 80% of total banking sector 
assets in most CESEE countries.
Against the background of improvements in the 
macro-structural environment and other supply 
and demand-side factors, bank lending to the 
private sector gathered momentum at the turn of 
the millennium. In fact, strengthened structural, 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, 
the supply-side improvement associated with 
the entry of foreign ﬁ  nancial institutions, as well 
as robust output and income growth which have 
underpinned credit demand, all played an 
important role in boosting credit growth. By the 
middle of the decade, however, levels of private 
sector credit-to-GDP ratios (see Chart 7) had 
become fairly elevated relative to the underlying 
fundamentals and overshot in some CESEE 
countries towards the end of the boom.10
The related increase in credit risk induced many 
CESEE central banks to take action with a view 
to reining in credit growth and/or the growth in 
foreign currency-denominated credit, which was 
increasingly ﬁ  nanced by capital inﬂ  ows into the 
region. The measures ranged from tightening 
minimum reserve requirements (e.g. Croatia, 
Romania), to administrative and prudential 
measures, like the introduction of credit ceilings 
For more details on the computation of equilibrium credit-to-GDP 10 
ratio levels, see e.g. Backé, Égert and Walko (2007) and Zumer, 
Égert and Backé (2009).
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(e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia). However, given banks’ 
circumvention strategies, such measures often 
had only a limited and at best temporary effect.11 
More recently, however, the global economic 
and  ﬁ   nancial crisis brought the ﬁ  nancial 
deepening process to an abrupt halt, although 
relatively low ﬁ  nancial intermediation levels – 
compared to the euro area average – still signal 
long-term catching-up potential.
2.3 MACRO-FINANCIAL  STRENGTHS 
AND VULNERABILITIES AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE CRISIS
Many CESEE countries accumulated 
considerable economic and ﬁ  nancial  risks 
and vulnerabilities in the run-up to the global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, which in many 
instances seem to have worked as a catalyst for 
spillovers from the crisis. In this section, we use 
standard vulnerability indicators to gauge the 
strengths and vulnerabilities of CESEE before 
the outbreak of the global crisis, while trying to 
put these vulnerabilities into perspective.
By standard vulnerability indicators we refer 
to economic variables which, according to the 
literature on currency, banking or twin crises, 
indicate potential risks or which have good 
properties as leading crisis indicators. In this 
paper, we compare the status of those indicators 
before the current crisis with their relative 
position before previous crisis episodes. More 
speciﬁ   cally, we look at six sets of indicators 
which try to capture the market sentiment 
vis-à-vis CESEE as well as vulnerabilities in 
the real, public, monetary, external and banking 
sectors (see Table 1).12 
It is important to note, however, that the 
link between vulnerabilities and performance 
Certain exceptions in this respect are Croatia, which took a host  11 
of measures to rein in credit growth based on banks’ foreign 
liabilities and expanded the scope of these measures to retain 
their effectiveness, and Poland, which appears to have had some 
success in increasing the awareness of exchange rate risk in the 
population.
A similar exercise, comparing the vulnerability patterns of  12 
CESEE and Latin America at the beginning of the crisis, can be 
found in Gallego et al. (2010). 
Table 1 Vulnerability indicators
Group Indicator  Measure Interpretation 
Sentiment 
indicators 
Sovereign  spreads  Points,  JPM  EMBIG  Europe  Proxies for market and foreign investor sentiment; 
also gauges contagion from a global or other emerging 
market crisis. 
Sovereign rating Average of the numerical value 
assigned to sovereign rating 
by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
Domestic stock exchange 
index 





Industrial  output  Year-on-year  change,  percentage  Leading indicator of current and future economic 
growth. 
Interest rates  3-month nominal money market 
rates, percentage 
Variables determining investment and consumption 
propensity.
HICP   Year-on-year change, percentage




Budget balance Percentage of GDP Signal pressures from public ﬁ  nances on monetary and 
exchange rate policies and indicate ﬁ  nancing pressures 
for the public sector.
Public debt Percentage of GDP
Interest payments  Percentage of budget revenues  Signals debt servicing pressures on public ﬁ  nances and 




Money supply (M2)  Year-on-year change, real, 
HICP-deﬂ  ated 
Try to capture issues related to monetary policies, 
credit growth in the banking system and the way it is 
ﬁ  nanced.  Deposits  Year-on-year change, real, 
HICP-deﬂ  ated 
Credit  Year-on-year change, real, 
HICP-deﬂ  ated 16
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during crisis periods is neither simple nor 
straightforward. In fact, empirical evidence from 
earlier crisis episodes is not conclusive on how, 
when and to what extent vulnerabilities materialise 
when a shock hits. Moreover, the regional results 
refer to stylised averages and are not necessarily 
indicative of the vulnerability proﬁ  le of individual 
countries, as they hide major differences in levels 
and dynamics across the region (for details of 
the vulnerability proﬁ   le of individual CESEE 
countries, see the statistical annex).
We present the vulnerability indicators in the 
form of cobweb charts, which can be read as 
follows: a data point located closer to the origin 
of the cobweb represents less vulnerabilities, 
while a data point further away from the origin 
represents a larger degree of vulnerability. Data 
are normalised to give a clearer picture of the 
development of each indicator over time.13 
The reference date we are using for the current 
crisis is September 2008, given that the 
spillovers of the global crisis reached 
CESEE mostly thereafter.14 The reference points 
in time – for the same sample of CESEE 
countries – are December 2001 (Argentine 
crisis) and August 1998 (Russian crisis). 
Observations are standardised based on the long-term average  13 
and the standard deviation of the series. The impact of trends in 
the data is not accounted for. A value above zero means a positive 
deviation from the long-term average expressed in standard 
deviation terms. In order to maintain that a cobweb closer to the 
origin represents less vulnerability, some variables are inverted 
(sovereign ratings, domestic stock index, budget balance, deposit 
growth, industrial output growth, current account balance, FDI, 
net portfolio investment ﬂ  ows, net foreign assets, basic balance, 
return on equity, capital adequacy ratio, long-term foreign 
exchange deposit rating and relative bank stock price).
For daily and monthly data we use the weighted average of the  14 
six months before the month of the respective crisis, while for 
quarterly data we use the weighted average of the four quarters 
before the quarter of the respective crisis. CESEE aggregates are 
calculated as weighted averages of country data based on each 
country’s share in regional GDP.
Table 1 Vulnerability indicators (cont’d)
Group Indicator  Measure Interpretation 
External 
indicators
Current account balance Percentage of GDP Captures external ﬁ  nancing needs and indicates balance 
of payments pressures.
FDI Percentage of GDP Which part of the external ﬁ  nancing needs is covered 
by rather long-term and stable capital inﬂ  ows. Basic balance Percentage of GDP
Short-term external debt Percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves
Estimates the capacity to confront a sudden stop in 
short-term capital inﬂ  ows or short-term debt rollovers 
with central bank resources.
External debt Percentage of GDP Capacity to repay external liabilities.
Net portfolio investment 
inﬂ  ows
Percentage of GDP Potential short-term outﬂ  ows in case of a sudden stop.
Net foreign 
assets (NFA)
Percentage of GDP Structural measure of a country’s position as external 
creditor or debtor and the effects in the case of a more 
pronounced depreciation of the currency.
Banking 
indicators
Domestic banks’ foreign 
liabilities 
Percentage of banks’ 
foreign assets 
Proxy for currency mismatches in case of a devaluation 
and the dependence of banks on external sources 
of funds. 
Long-term foreign exchange 
deposit rating (Moody’s) 
Points Reﬂ   ects the foreign investor sentiment about a 
country’s banking sector.
Stock price index 
for domestic banks 
Percentage of domestic stock 
exchange index (all sectors) 
Represents the investor conﬁ   dence vis-á-vis listed 
banks relative to the rest of the stock exchange. 
Loan-to-deposit  ratio  Percentage  Measures whether credit is increasing faster than 
deposits and is ﬁ  nanced through other possibly less 
stable sources. 
Foreign  exchange  loans  Percentage  of  total  loans  Measure of the currency mismatch of bank clients, 
and the potential increase in non-performing loans in case 
of downward pressures on national currencies. 
Non-performing loans (NPL)  Percentage of total loans  Gauges  the  pressure  from  non-performing  loans  on 
banking sector balances. 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR)  Percentage  Solvency of the banking sector. 
Return on equity (ROE)  Percentage, after-tax  Proﬁ  tability of the banking sector. 17
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2   SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS IN GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
These two crises both impacted emerging 
market economies worldwide, although the 
Russian crisis had a more pronounced impact on 
the CESEE countries than the Argentine crisis. 
That said, the latter is a useful additional 
reference point in order to get a more complete 
picture of changes in the region’s vulnerabilities 
over time. 
Gauging the vulnerabilities of the CESEE 
region at the beginning of the recent crisis can 
shed some light on the main channels through 
which the region was affected. It is less useful to 
assess the magnitude of the subsequent impact 
because the latter is closely related to the overall 
magnitude of the crisis itself. The CESEE 
countries may have been better prepared to 
weather a crisis in 2008 than they were in 1998, 
but if the crisis itself was more severe, the better 
preparedness may not translate into a milder 
outcome.
The sentiment indicators illustrate that the 
CESEE region was more positively assessed by 
ﬁ  nancial markets in 2008 than before the other 
two crises (see Chart 8). This was partly due to 
the favourable overall global ﬁ  nancial market 
situation, which may have distorted ﬁ  nancial 
markets’ assessment of CESEE as well as other 
regions. There were, however, also important 
region-speciﬁ  c factors. In light of the progress 
made in economic restructuring since the 
mid-1990s, all CESEE countries gained 
investment-grade status (or climbed even further 
up the rating ladder). The related fall in risk 
premia not only led to a drop in sovereign 
spreads, but also made the region more attractive 
for foreign investors, which boosted stock 
market performance and other asset prices. 
Moreover, the EU/euro area “halo effect”  15 
(or the prospect of EU accession) and the 
sustained good medium- and long-term 
economic prospects of the region (despite rising 
economic imbalances in some countries) seem 
to have bolstered investors’ conﬁ  dence in the 
region in the run-up to the global crisis.
Selected real and nominal indicators also 
suggest that the region was better off in 
September 2008 than before previous crises 
See Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007). 15 
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(see Chart 8). In fact, the monetary stabilisation 
after periods of transition-related monetary 
distortions (e.g. hyperinﬂ  ation) in many CESEE 
countries in the early/mid-1990s coupled with 
favourable global inﬂ  ationary  developments 
have contributed to a more benign inﬂ  ationary 
environment and thus also to falling interest rate 
levels. In addition, the deep-rooted economic 
restructuring of the 1990s, the region’s 
integration in EU trade structures and strong 
export-oriented FDI inﬂ  ows in many countries 
allowed for a gradual expansion of industrial 
production capacities and export growth.
Fiscal indicators also show a rather favourable 
picture. Headline ﬁ  scal balances have improved 
considerably over time (see Chart 9), although in 
some countries the underlying ﬁ  scal stance was 
rather pro-cyclical in recent years (as suggested 
by cyclically adjusted primary budget ﬁ  gures) 
and – more generally – the lower ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits 
have to be seen against the background of very 
strong growth and were thus not necessarily 
sustainable. In light of improving ﬁ  scal positions, 
public debt levels stabilised, resulting in interest 
charges on public debt gradually falling relative 
to budget revenues.
By contrast, monetary indicators show a rising 
trend over time (see Chart 9). Real M2 and real 
private sector credit rose before September 2008 
at higher rates than before previous crises. 
Although credit growth was to some extent 
justiﬁ  ed by a catching-up process to levels of 
credit over GDP in line with regional per capita 
GDP, rapid credit growth was also a warning 
signal, as credit rose much faster than deposits.
CESEE external sector vulnerability indicators 
also tended to worsen in 2008 compared with 
previous crisis episodes (see Chart 10). Many 
countries, in particular in the Baltics and SEE 
(except Romania, all of them ﬁ  xed exchange rate 
countries), experienced a considerable widening 
of their current account deﬁ  cits. This was partly 
a result of booming domestic demand, but also 
due to the global commodity price boom. 
FDI inﬂ  ows remained substantial, but – in most 
countries – were not fully covering the current 
account deﬁ  cits. This resulted in a pick-up in 
external debt levels over time. In particular, 
short-term external debt increased so that, 
despite a strong build-up in foreign exchange 
reserves, the ratio of short-term external debt 
to foreign exchange reserves deteriorated in the 
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2   SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS IN GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
run-up to the global crisis. This in turn made 
CESEE more vulnerable to changes in investor 
sentiment and sudden stops, although also the 
development in short-term debt is not uniform 
across the region.
Finally, looking at banking sector vulnerabilities, 
the rising loan-to-deposit ratio signals that 
deposit growth could not keep up with credit 
growth. Thus, banks had to rely increasingly on 
other reﬁ   nancing sources, mainly foreign 
funding. This translated into a rising ratio of 
foreign liabilities over foreign assets in many 
countries in the region, although there are 
again some exceptions, in particular the 
Czech Republic and Poland. In a number of 
CESEE countries, a large share of credits were 
issued in foreign currency (mostly unhedged 
positions vis-à-vis households), which added to 
the banking sectors’ vulnerability proﬁ  le.16 
Against the background of banks’ changing 
credit business proﬁ   le (which shifted from 
government to private sector ﬁ  nancing), bank 
capitalisation moderated slightly over time, 
although the average capital adequacy ratio 
remained well above legal requirements. The 
non-performing loan ratio improved also over 
time, following transition-related banking 
reforms and the recent expansion of bank 
balance sheets due to strong credit growth. 
The latter was to a large extent driven by 
mortgage lending growth, which in turn was 
related to rapid growth in house prices resulting 
in an overvaluation of house prices in some 
CESEE countries. Lower provisioning 
requirements, booming credit growth, rising 
bank efﬁ   ciency and better bank governance 
(a result of the large-scale entry of foreign banks 
and improved bank supervisory and regulatory 
structures) also led to increased bank proﬁ  tability 
until 2008 (see Chart 10). Finally, improvements 
in Moody’s long-term foreign exchange deposit 
ratings and bank stock valuations imply a 
positive investor sentiment towards CESEE 
banking sectors too.
The overall conclusion from these charts is 
mixed. Vulnerabilities had increased in the 
Again, average numbers hide cross-country differences. Foreign  16 
currency credit in the Czech Republic is for example minimal. 
Determinants of foreign currency borrowing in CESEE are 
investigated inter alia by Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008).
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CESEE region in some areas compared with the 
past, notably in the external and banking sectors. 
In addition, some monetary indicators (mainly 
credit growth) also suggest that vulnerabilities 
in the region were higher in 2008 than before 
previous crises. By contrast, sentiment, real and 
nominal, as well as ﬁ   scal indicators suggest 
a decline in the region’s macro-ﬁ  nancial 
vulnerabilities over time, implying that the 
CESEE region was in these respects better 
prepared for the possible repercussions of a crisis 
than it was in 1998 or in 2001. As mentioned 
above, however, given the magnitude of the 
crisis itself, the better (partial) preparedness was 
not a guarantee for a benign impact of the crisis 
on the region. 21
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3  THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS ON CESEE 17
The global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis affected 
the CESEE region through various channels of 
transmission. Although the schematic depiction 
below is not exhaustive and there might be 
overlaps and feedback loops between the various 
channels (see Chart 11), it provides a good 
starting point for analysing the spillovers of the 
global crisis to CESEE. In addition, one should 
bear in mind possible second-round effects of 
spillovers from affected emerging economies 
to developed countries and/or spillovers among 
emerging economies.18
In general, there are three ﬁ  nancial transmission 
channels through which the global crisis may 
affect the CESEE region: direct and indirect 
channels, as well as second-round effects. 
The direct channel works mainly via changes 
in the prices of toxic assets in the portfolios 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions. The indirect ﬁ  nancial 
channels, which become important once there 
is a deterioration of foreign investor sentiment 
towards emerging markets, relate to asset prices, 
money and debt markets as well as capital 
ﬂ   ows. In this regard, the ﬁ   rst two channels 
explain price effects, while the third one refers 
to volume effects. Looking in more detail at the 
indirect ﬁ  nancial transmission channels, a loss 
of investor conﬁ  dence can hit the CESEE region 
ﬁ  rst via foreign exchange, stock and real estate 
This chapter reviews developments between 30 June 2007 and  17 
31 December 2009.
For more details, see Balakrishnan et al. (2009). 18 
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markets. This in turn can have a negative impact 
on the real economy by lowering consumption 
and investment activity. In addition, 
a weakening of currencies can drive up inﬂ  ation 
and pose a challenge for banks in countries with 
sizeable foreign currency lending to unhedged 
borrowers. At the same time, an increase in risk 
aversion could reduce the access to ﬁ  nancing 
for governments (but also corporations and 
banks) on money and debt markets and/or make 
it more expensive. A slowdown (or sudden stop) 
in capital inﬂ  ows can hit particularly enterprises 
and banks in countries with heavy reliance on 
foreign funding. Second-round effects relate 
to feedback loops from a slump in economic 
activity which may negatively impact ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, inter alia via deteriorating credit 
quality, rising non-performing loans, declining 
proﬁ   tability and increased problems retaining 
the necessary capitalisation.
The aforementioned disruptions in ﬁ  nancial 
markets, together with a slump in external 
demand, affect also the real economy.19 
However, the real economy channels transmitted 
their full impact with a certain time-lag vis-à-vis 
the ﬁ  nancial market channels. 
The anatomy of the spillovers of the global 
crisis to CESEE shows that the channels of 
transmission mentioned before have been at 
work at different points in time and affected 
CESEE countries in different stages of the 
crisis. In addition, the economic downturn in the 
Baltic countries, at that point driven mostly by 
domestic factors, started already in the course 
of 2007.20 The global crisis intensiﬁ  ed  rather 
than triggered the downswing in the Baltic 
countries. In general, however, given no or 
negligible exposures to subprime or subprime-
related assets, CESEE ﬁ  nancial  markets 
weathered the global crisis relatively well until 
mid-September 2008 and have thus been hardly 
hit through the direct channels of ﬁ  nancial 
transmission. 
Since September 2008, however, the global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis gained markedly 
in depth and intensity and waning foreign 
investor conﬁ  dence towards emerging markets 
in general and CESEE in particular dashed 
hopes of a decoupling.21 In fact, CESEE 
countries were hit hard via the indirect ﬁ  nancial 
transmission channels (in many respects even 
harder than other emerging market regions such 
as Latin America  22), while at the same time, 
in light of the slump in global demand, 
the foreign trade channel started to become 
active. Given the large degree of openness of 
the CESEE countries and the high share of 
manufactured products in their export structure, 
this channel had a particularly strong effect on 
the region. Financial market conditions remained 
tense until March 2009, when the long-lasting 
downward trend ﬁ   nally came to a halt and 
ﬁ  nancial markets stabilised at fairly low levels.
Driven by highly accommodative monetary 
policies in the industrial world, as well as 
large-scale coordinated support measures 
(e.g. by the IMF and the EU), global investor 
sentiment improved and the second and third 
quarters of 2009 saw a strong recovery of 
ﬁ  nancial markets which helped to partly make 
up for previous losses. At the same time, the 
real transmission channels operated with some 
time-lag, and second-round effects on the 
banking sectors and labour markets started to 
materialise in the course of 2009.
3.1  IMPACT ON SELECTED FINANCIAL MARKET 
SEGMENTS
3.1.1 TOXIC ASSETS
The CESEE region was largely resilient to the 
toxic asset problem. According to full-year 2007 
and 2008 reporting of large CESEE banks, local 
banks’ exposure to subprime-related assets, 
i.e. asset-backed securities and collateralised 
debt obligations, has been negligible. There 
are a number of reasons for the limited direct 
Using somewhat different categories, Obiora (2009) looks  19 
empirically at the relative importance of various transmission 
channels for the Baltic States.
See European Commission (2010) and Martin and Zauchinger  20 
(2009).
See Frank and Hesse (2009). 21 
For a comparison of the experiences of CESEE and Latin  22 
America during the crisis, see e.g. Backé et al. (2010).23
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exposure of CESEE to the crisis. First and 
foremost, CESEE ﬁ  nancial sectors still exhibit a 
low degree of sophistication: market penetration 
by complex ﬁ  nancial products is low and the 
number of specialised ﬁ  nancial intermediaries is 
small. Second, capitalising on the proﬁ  table and 
booming local lending business in unsaturated 
markets seemed more promising for CESEE 
banks than engaging in foreign structured 
products, for which demand was low or 
non-existent. Finally, banking sectors in CESEE 
countries are dominated by foreign banks, with 
parent banks’ exposure to subprime-related 
assets appearing to be manageable as well in 
most cases.23
3.1.2 ASSET PRICES
CESEE asset prices were rather resilient to 
the global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis until 
September 2008. Thereafter, however, stock 
and – in many CESEE countries – real estate 
prices were severely hit, although developments 
have diverged considerably within the region. 
Signs of stabilisation and recovery in these 
markets have been observed since March 2009.
Looking  ﬁ   rst at stock market developments, 
the downward correction has been particularly 
pronounced in the Baltic and SEE countries 
(see Chart 12). These cross-country differences 
can to a large extent be explained by 
country-speciﬁ  c political, economic and social 
aspects (e.g. protests against austerity measures), 
all impacting (foreign) investor sentiment.24 
In many countries the stock market plunges are 
also to be seen in the context of long-lasting 
stock market rallies before the outbreak of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. In fact, until September 2008 
the CESEE region outperformed mature stock 
markets in the US and Europe as well as other 
emerging market regions. Only Latin America 
performed somewhat better during this period.25
Real estate prices in most CESEE countries also 
developed very dynamically in recent years 
(see Table 2).26 House price growth was 
supported by various factors, like the fast rise in 
disposable income, increased demand for 
housing by foreign investors and the enhanced 
availability and affordability of mortgages. 
These developments appear to have reinforced 
each other and there is empirical evidence 
suggesting that housing loan growth played an 
important role in house price dynamics 
(Égert and Mihaljek, 2007). In some countries, 
housing subsidies and/or favourable tax 
treatment of housing loans have also contributed 
to stronger real estate demand and higher 
house prices.
Toxic assets can in principle also have other indirect impacts  23 
on CESEE banks. If for example CESEE banks hold securities 
issued by foreign ﬁ  nancial institutions (active or inactive in the 
subprime segment), changes in their standing can have an effect 
on the securities valuations of CESEE banks. See Narodowy 
Bank Polski (2008).
Equities of banking and other ﬁ  nancial institutions as well as  24 
raw material-related corporations were among the worst-hit, 
i.e. equities which have strongly beneﬁ  ted from the favourable 
global liquidity conditions and the related raw material boom in 
the ﬁ  rst half of the past decade.
In late 2008, however, the MSCI EMEE index (covering the  25 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia) lost in two months 
more than 50% in value, much more than any other emerging 
market region in the world.
On this issue, see inter alia Égert and Martin (2008), Walko  26 
(2008b) and for a case study on Estonia Lamine (2009).













































Sources: Datastream and OeNB. 
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House prices started to decelerate in the Baltic 
countries in 2007 and were falling strongly 
in 2009 in all ﬁ   xed exchange rate countries 
although to a lower extent in Croatia. The 
end of the house price boom is likely to have 
considerable repercussions. On the ﬁ  nancial side, 
the demand (and most likely also the supply) 
for new mortgages has fallen considerably, 
and in most countries an increasing share of 
the existing mortgages are becoming problem 
loans. On the real economy side, falling demand 
for new housing implies falling demand in the 
construction sector, which in recent years was 
an important driver of growth in many CESEE 
countries.
Similar to stock markets and housing prices, 
CESEE currencies were initially hardly affected 
by the global economic and ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
(see Chart 13).27 Against the background of 
strongly appreciating (possibly overshooting) 
currencies, negative global investor sentiment, 
perceptions of an approaching end of the policy 
rate cycle and in some cases adverse country-
speciﬁ   c factors, however, all free-ﬂ  oating 
CESEE currencies came under intensiﬁ  ed 
market pressure from September 2008, before 
recovering since March 2009 (except for the 
Romanian leu).
Exchange rate pressures prompted many central 
banks to intervene, either verbally (e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary) 
and/or through direct foreign exchange market 
interventions (e.g. Romania).28 Also CESEE 
countries with ﬁ   xed or quasi-ﬁ  xed  exchange 
rate regimes felt downward pressures. In Latvia 
and Croatia central banks intervened on the 
In fact, between the outbreak of the global crisis and September  27 
2008, the major regional currencies appreciated substantially. 
The only exception was the Romanian leu, which depreciated 
after August 2007.
In addition, the Polish government started to sell EU funds  28 
directly on foreign exchange markets to support the zloty and 
later similar actions were announced in Hungary.
Table 2 House price developments in CESEE
(percentages; year-on-year)
House price growth 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Last quarter
Bulgaria 0.3 1.8 12.2 47.6 36.6 14.7 28.9 24.9 -21.4 -26.3 Q4/09
Czech Rep. 11.1 12.4 14.5 9.0 1.4 -0.6 6.5 21.1
Estonia 2.5 34.2 29.5 12.9 27.8 30.9 51.8 10.1 -12.3 -39.4 -40.3 Q4/09
Croatia -1.7 6.8 1.8 0.5 12.9 8.8 16.6 13.0 5.8 -4.1
Latvia 20.0 159.3 45.1 -18.3 -30.5
Lithuania -9.3 23.8 9.5 18.0 9.9 51.8 39.2 33.5 5.2 -33.0 Q2/09
Hungary 17.6 18.7 12.6 20.8 2.8 0.8 -1.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 -0.5 Q4/09
Poland 7.3 10.0 -4.1 -6.7 7.3 20.0 3.8 45.3 42.4
Source: National central banks
Chart 13 Exchange rate developments 
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foreign exchange markets in order to keep the 
exchange rate within the ±1% ﬂ  uctuation band 
(Latvia) or to prevent a more marked weakening 
(Croatia).29 
3.1.3 MONEY AND DEBT MARKETS
Money and debt markets, as well as risk 
premia as reﬂ  ected by CDS spreads, remained 
relatively stable until September 2008 in the 
CESEE region, but were strongly affected by 
the crisis afterwards due to waning investor 
conﬁ  dence and rising ﬁ  nancing and default risks 
in some countries. In most CESEE countries 
money and debt markets improved again in 
the course of 2009, although the levels prior to 
September 2008 had not been reached again by 
the end of 2009. 
Money market rate spreads increased strongly 
in the second half of 2008, with Romania 
and Latvia being most affected although at 
different points in time (see Chart 14). These 
spreads remained broadly stable throughout 
the region in 2009. Notable improvements in 
money market conditions were seen, however, 
in Croatia and Latvia.
As of late 2008 CESEE local currency 
government bond spreads also increased 
throughout the region and became more volatile 
(see Chart 15). In some countries, severe 
bond market tensions even emerged, with 
authorities stepping in to ease market tensions. 
Unlike other ﬁ  nancial market segments, which 
improved considerably in the course of 2009, 
local currency government bond yield spreads 
remained at elevated levels in some CESEE 
countries, notably Latvia and Lithuania.
A marked widening of sovereign Eurobond 
spreads from around September 2008 was 
common to all CESEE countries, but the 
subsequent development of Eurobond 
spreads varied signiﬁ   cantly across the region 
In Croatia, the central bank also changed reserve requirements to  29 
counter downward pressures on the kuna.
Chart 14 Money market developments 
in CESEE




































Sources: Datastream and OeNB.
Chart 15 Local currency government bond 
market developments


























Sources: Eurostat and OeNB.26
ECB
Occasional Paper No 114
June 2010
(see Chart 16). The spreads on Polish euro-
denominated sovereign Eurobonds remained 
relatively compressed over the review period, 
while more pronounced increases were 
observed in Romania and Lithuania. Eurobond 
spreads have come down considerably since 
March 2009, but (with the exception of Poland) 
were still clearly above pre-crisis levels as at 
end-2009. Taking advantage of the improving 
global investor sentiment and falling risk premia, 
many CESEE countries tapped international 
ﬁ   nancial markets from mid-2009 and issued 
USD- or EUR-denominated Eurobonds.
Turning to risk premia, ﬁ  ve-year sovereign CDS 
spreads trended continuously upwards in 2008 
and early 2009 (see Chart 17). Similar to the 
developments in Eurobond spreads, CDS spreads 
rose particularly strongly in countries with large 
macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. Hungary, 
Romania and the Baltic States). Amidst a more 
favourable global environment, some CESEE 
countries reached by and large pre-crisis CDS 
spread levels by the end of 2009.
3.1.4 CAPITAL FLOWS
CESEE economies have also been affected by 
the ﬁ  nancial turmoil via the tightening of global 
credit conditions, resulting in a slowdown 
(or temporary reversal) of capital inﬂ  ows into 
the region. In order to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of capital movements, we look at the 
balance of payments ﬂ   ows, the external debt 
statistics and the claims and liabilities of BIS 
reporting banks.
First, according to balance of payments data, 
in the second half of 2008 and then again in 
the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 total net capital inﬂ  ows 
dropped considerably, very often from levels 
of (well) over 10% of GDP (see Chart 18). 
The picture altered later in 2009, when in many 
CESEE economies portfolio investments turned 
positive again on the back of improving global 
foreign investor sentiment. At the same time, 
net FDI inﬂ  ows were mostly limited in 2009 and 
even turned temporarily negative in a number of 
countries (e.g. Hungary, Estonia and Latvia). 
Other investment inﬂ  ows to the private sector 
Chart 16 Euro-denominated Eurobond yield 
spread developments
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(comprising capital ﬂ  ows to the corporate and 
banking sectors as well as funds ﬂ  owing from 
international  ﬁ  nancial  institution/EU  ﬁ  nancial 
support packages) turned mostly positive again 
in the course of last year but remained negative 
at the end of 2009 in Latvia and Lithuania.
Second, external debt statistics show more 
or less pronounced increases in external debt 
levels in all CESEE countries under review 
throughout 2009. Besides the strong fall in 
GDP in 2009, this can be attributed to resuming 
foreign borrowing of the corporate sector 
starting from the second quarter of 2009 and a 
pick-up in public sector external debt following 
various Eurobond issues and/or international 
support measures.
In more detail, non-ﬁ  nancial corporations’ direct 
access to foreign funding was more limited in 
the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2009 (see Chart 19). The corporate sector’s 
gross external debt stock fell or remained stable 
in most CESEE countries from mid-2008 up to 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009.30 This may indicate that 
no or fewer new credit lines were granted and/or 
that existing credit lines have not been rolled 
over or were called due early. In addition, falling 
demand for new credits is likely to have played 
a role in this development too. Given the 
improving global environment later in 2009 this 
trend reversed thereafter though. In this context, 
IMF (2009b) suggests that rollover rates of 
foreign exchange-denominated corporate debt 
were higher in CESEE than in other emerging 
market regions during the peak of the crisis, but 
debt restructuring in other emerging market 
regions was faster in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009.
A different picture emerges when looking at 
foreign debt related to inter-company loans 
(to non-ﬁ   nancial corporations), which 
remained stable or increased in all CESEE 
countries during nearly the whole crisis period. 
In the context of capital ﬂ  ows, it is important to differentiate  30 
between ﬂ  ows (balance of payments data) and changes in stocks 
(external debt statistics and BIS data on claims and liabilities 
of BIS reporting banks), as the latter also comprise exchange 
rate effects, reclassiﬁ  cations and other adjustments, as well as 
revaluation adjustments (e.g. write-offs of loans, securities price 
changes).
Chart 18 Capital flows in CESEE
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This reﬂ  ects that parent companies continued 
to provide ﬁ  nancing to their subsidiaries during 
the crisis. Changes in the banking sectors’ 
external indebtedness are more heterogenous, 
but overall tend to decrease (especially in the 
ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009). However, foreign parent 
banks continued to support their subsidiaries 
in CESEE, in some cases with an explicit 
commitment in the context of international 
stabilisation packages. 
Third, looking at the claims and liabilities of 
BIS reporting banks,31 capital inﬂ  ows to CESEE 
remained considerable up to the ﬁ   rst half of 
2008. From September 2008, however, capital 
inﬂ  ows slowed down, with the claims of BIS 
reporting banks on some CESEE countries 
with rather liquid banking systems, like the 
Czech Republic and Poland (see Chart 20), even 
decreasing in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008. 
According to Mihaljek (2009), this implies that 
parent banks may have temporarily withdrawn 
liquidity from these markets to meet their 
liquidity needs at home. In the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 
(in many countries also in the second half) BIS 
reporting banks further reduced their positions 
vis-à-vis CESEE, mainly Romania and the 
Baltic States (see Chart 21), thereby most likely 
responding to a sharp fall in credit demand as a 
result of deteriorating economic conditions. 
Nevertheless, CESEE has not experienced a 
major meltdown in cross-border banking ﬂ  ows, 
with foreign bank ownership providing a shelter 
against reversals in capital ﬂ  ows.32
The liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis
the CESEE region (corresponding to CESEE 
banks’ foreign assets) turned (remained) 
BIS data on claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks are  31 
based on the BIS international locational banking statistics 
and represent exchange rate-adjusted changes in stocks 
(in this paper expressed relative to GDP). The ﬁ  gures may be 
distorted by valuation effects (apart from exchange rate changes) 
which, however, cannot be separately identiﬁ  ed. According to 
the BIS methodological guidelines, “the principal balance sheet 
items to be included as claims are deposits and balances placed 
with banks, loans and advances to banks and non-banks and 
holdings of securities and participations; on the liabilities side, 
the data should mainly relate to deposits and loans received from 
banks and non-banks.”
For further details, see Mihaljek (2009). Using ﬁ  rm-level data,  32 
Popov and Udell (2010) ﬁ  nd, however, that ﬁ  nancial distress at 
western European and US parent banks had a signiﬁ  cant negative 
impact on business lending to central and eastern European ﬁ  rms.
Chart 19 External debt structure by debtors in CESEE
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Chart 20 Claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks
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Chart 21 Claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks
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negative in the second half of 2008 (ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2009) as well, an indication that tight global 
liquidity conditions and limited access to foreign 
funding induced CESEE banks to repatriate parts 
of their foreign assets. In some cases this was 
supported or driven by central bank measures. 
For example, in Croatia, the relaxation of 
foreign currency liquidity regulations by the 
Croatian National Bank (HNB) in February 2009 
(with the aim of alleviating the government’s 
ﬁ  nancing needs) facilitated banks’ recourse to 
their foreign assets. By contrast, in Poland, a 
large part of the reduction of liabilities of BIS 
reporting banks vis-à-vis Poland in the ﬁ  nal 
quarter of 2008 is related to Narodowy Bank 
Polski’s foreign exchange reserve management 
(shift out of deposits with foreign banks and into 
foreign government securities) and balance sheet 
shortening (presumably to limit counterparty 
risk). With the stabilisation of global ﬁ  nancial 
markets and easing liquidity pressures, from the 
second quarter of 2009 banks in many CESEE 
countries again started to rebuild foreign assets.
Overall, the global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis 
had a major impact on capital ﬂ  ows to CESEE, 
although the magnitude of the impact differed 
depending on the type of capital inﬂ  ows and the 
receiving country. External ﬁ  nancing problems 
mounted in a few CESEE countries in late 
2008 and early 2009, and IFI/EU assistance 
was needed to stabilise the situation. Available 
data suggest that capital outﬂ  ows  were 
temporary and that in particular FDI inﬂ  ows and 
inter-company loans played a positive role since 
the outbreak of the crisis.
3.1.5 SECOND-ROUND EFFECTS ON THE BANKING 
SECTOR
CESEE banking sectors were fairly resilient to 
the global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis until 
autumn 2008. Proﬁ  tability levels remained high 
thanks to strong (albeit decelerating) credit 
growth and the share of non-performing loans in 
total loans reached, or stabilised at, often 
historically low levels.33 In the second half of 
2008, however, a number of supply- and 
demand-side factors negatively affected bank 
lending throughout the region (see Chart 22). 
These factors included the increasingly tight 
global liquidity conditions (also before 
September 2008), the slowdown in capital 
inﬂ   ows to CESEE (from September 2008), 
banks’ increased risk aversion and falling credit 
demand against the background of strongly 
decelerating investment and consumption 
growth. As a result, credit growth in many 
countries decelerated sharply or even came to a 
halt in 2008 and 2009, a process which started 
in the Baltic States and Croatia  34 as early as 
end-2007 or early 2008.
In a more recent analysis on Latvia, Hungary 
and Poland, the World Bank (2009a) notes 
some cross-country differences as regards the 
role supply- and demand-side factors play in the 
slowdown of credit growth, which is particularly 
important from the policy perspective. While for 
The Baltic States represent an exception in this regard, as the  33 
economic downturn had begun already back in early 2008. For 
more details, see Martin and Zauchinger (2009).
In Croatia this process was reinforced by administrative  34 
prudential measures introduced by the HNB already in 2007 with 
a view to curbing credit growth.
Chart 22 Domestic credit developments
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Hungary the analysis suggests a credit crunch 
from the third quarter of 2008 through the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009, in Latvia the credit crunch in 
the second half of 2008 became a demand-side 
problem in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009. In Poland, 
however, subdued credit demand started to 
weigh on credit growth already in the ﬁ  nal 
quarter of 2008.
Deposit growth also came down to more 
moderate levels by the end of 2008 and 
continued to slow in 2009, especially in the 
Baltic States and SEE (see Chart 23). This can 
largely be attributed to worsening labour market 
conditions, more moderate wage growth and the 
related need for consumption smoothing, but in 
a few countries also to waning public conﬁ  dence 
in banks, as a result of which some countries 
experienced temporary deposit withdrawals by 
households (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia) in late 2008 
and early 2009.35 At the same time, the currency 
composition of savings hardly changed for the 
CESEE region as a whole, with the share of 
foreign currency deposits remaining fairly stable 
around 22% of total deposits.
In late 2008 the rapid and marked worsening of 
economic fundamentals also started to affect the 
banking sector. The deteriorating economic 
conditions in the CESEE countries ampliﬁ  ed 
credit and foreign exchange risks, with the latter 
risks pointing to possible adverse balance sheet 
effects. Increasing labour market pressures 
started to impede borrowers’ ability to repay 
their loans. Borrowers’ debt servicing capacity 
has been further impaired in countries with 
depreciating nominal exchange rates and 
predominance of foreign currency lending 
(e.g. Hungary, Romania).36 Consequently, the 
share of non-performing loans in total loans 
started to pick up in all CESEE countries in the 
second half of 2008 and increased further over 
the course of 2009 (see Chart 24).37 This 
development was particularly pronounced in 
Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, where the share 
of non-performing loans in total loans reached 
double-digit ﬁ  gures in 2009.
Increased credit risks and the related higher 
need for provisioning also started to put a strain 
on banking sector proﬁ  tability (see Chart 25). 
Thus, as of late 2008, return on equity started to 
decline more or less strongly all over the region, 
a development which was also underpinned by 
banks’ attempt to strengthen their capitalisation 
(in particular via retained earnings). Bank 
proﬁ   tability was eroded relatively strongly in 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, although in 
general banks remained proﬁ  table. In contrast, 
the banking sectors recorded pronounced losses 
in 2009 in the Baltic States.
On a more positive note, banking sector stability 
was less at risk in CESEE.38 According to Walko 
(2008a) this is due to the fact that ﬁ  nancing by 
capital and reserves plays a more prominent 
role in CESEE than in the euro area. This 
reﬂ   ects in particular higher capital adequacy 
For further details, see Dvorsky, Scheiber and Stix (2009). 35 
For further details on non-performing loans, see World Bank  36 
(2009b).
It is important to note, however, that given possible differences  37 
in classiﬁ  cation rules, the comparability of non-performing loan 
levels across countries might be limited.
Since the beginning of the crisis only Latvia’s Parex Bank  38 
required speciﬁ  c support measures by the authorities.
Chart 23 Domestic deposit developments






























Sources: National central banks and OeNB.32
ECB
Occasional Paper No 114
June 2010
requirements in many CESEE countries against 
the background of presumably more risky 
business environments, but may also be the 
result of the dominant position of foreign banks 
in CESEE with parent banks providing a portion 
of ﬁ  nancing to their subsidiaries in the form of 
equity. Capital adequacy remained stable at fairly 
high levels of over 10% in all countries under 
Chart 24 Developments in non-performing loans
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review, which is well above the internationally 
recommended 8% and national requirements 
(often stricter than international standards). 
Most countries even recorded sizeable increases 
in capital adequacy ratios (in some cases 
despite higher risk weights imposed by 
central banks), most likely through capital 
increases by bank owners, including parent 
banks (see Chart 26). However, often balance 
sheet restructuring and downsizing (reducing 
risk-weighted assets) seem to have contributed 
to this development too.
To sum up, negative second-round effects on the 
banking sector from deteriorating real economic 
conditions have now become increasingly 
visible. Given the time-lags involved, a further 
deterioration of key banking performance 
indicators for the CESEE countries cannot be 
ruled out. Continued sound capitalisation levels 
and the commitment of parent banks to keep the 
capitalisation of subsidiaries at sound levels are   
therefore important to support a high overall 
degree of banking sector stability.
3.2  IMPACT ON THE REAL ECONOMY
Real economic developments in CESEE were 
severely affected by the disruptions in ﬁ  nancial 
markets and the real channels of transmission, 
in particular the trade channel. When looking 
at the country-speciﬁ   c impact on the real 
economy, however, it is important to keep in 
mind the different starting points in terms of 
vulnerabilities at the onset of the crisis. Some 
CESEE countries accumulated sizeable domestic 
and external imbalances during the boom period 
and in countries with strong adjustment needs 
(in particular the Baltics) the spillovers from the 
global crisis worked not so much as a trigger but 
rather as an ampliﬁ  er of the economic downturn 
that started in 2007. Moreover, some of the real 
transmission channels – especially the domestic 
demand channel – had their full impact with a 
time-lag vis-à-vis the ﬁ  nancial channels. Except 
for the Baltic States, in most CESEE economies 
the crisis had hardly any visible impact on the 
real economy until the third quarter of 2008. In 
the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008, however, in parallel 
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with the indirect ﬁ  nancial transmission channels, 
the foreign trade channel was activated by a 
slump in global demand, triggering a slowdown 
in economic growth in all CESEE countries. 
The crisis fully spilled over to the real economy 
in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, with both foreign trade 
and domestic demand channels at work, and 
economic activity slumped throughout CESEE. 
Having bottomed out in the ﬁ  rst half of the year, 
most CESEE economies saw a mild recovery 
in economic dynamics in the latter part of 
2009, often driven by restocking. As a notable 
exception, Poland continued to record moderate 
positive economic growth in 2009. This might be 
attributable to (i) fairly low initial vulnerability 
levels, (ii) a lower degree of export dependence, 
(iii) a strong (albeit partly temporary) fall in 
the exchange rate (which notably contained 
imports), (iv) some ﬁ   scal stimulus and 
(v) infrastructure investments, which were 
partly ﬁ  nanced by the EU and to some extent 
driven by preparations for the Euro 2012 
football championship.
The trade channel appears to have been the 
most prominent real transmission channel of the 
crisis for most CESEE economies. This is not 
surprising given the region’s increasing trade 
deepening and rising trade integration with the 
EU in the last two decades. The collapse of trade 
ﬂ  ows was driven by the plunge in global demand 
in the second half of 2008 and exacerbated by 
the strong changes in capital ﬂ  ows which are 
relevant for trade ﬁ  nance. The country-speciﬁ  c
magnitude of this plunge in foreign trade 
volumes depended on the countries’ trade 
openness and trade specialisation. At the same 
time, imports collapsed on the back of a slump in 
domestic demand and gloomy export prospects, 
taking into account the high import content of 
exports in some CESEE economies. However, 
with imports falling more quickly than exports, 
the contribution of net exports to GDP growth 
turned positive in most countries (see Chart 27).
The slump in domestic demand in CESEE was 
inter alia caused by worsening labour market 
Chart 27 GDP growth and its components in CESEE

































Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Croatia







Sources: Eurostat and OeNB. 
1) Including statistical discrepancy.35
ECB
Occasional Paper No 114
June 2010




conditions and income prospects, a slowdown 
in remittance ﬂ   ows, deteriorating business 
and consumer conﬁ   dence, and tighter credit 
conditions. The composition of GDP growth 
thus showed major adjustments in domestic 
demand, especially in the ﬁ   rst half of 2009. 
The biggest adjustments were seen in gross 
ﬁ   xed capital formation, which is the most 
cyclical component and is affected directly by 
changes in the availability and cost of funding. 
The slowdown in investment was particularly 
strong in the Baltics, Romania and Bulgaria, 
where this component of domestic demand has 
shown very strong dynamics in recent years. 
Developments were similar, albeit not as severe, 
in private consumption, with the slowdown 
being particularly pronounced again in the 
Baltic States and Romania.
Recent forecasts for the CESEE countries are 
based on the assumption that the trough of the 
economic downturn was reached in the course 
of 2009 and that GDP growth in 2010 will be at 
least less negative than in 2009 (see Chart 28). 
The IMF’s April 2010 World Economic Outlook 
envisages GDP growth around zero in most 
CESEE countries in 2010. Only in Latvia and 
Lithuania, the countries with the most severe 
recession in 2009, is GDP still expected to 
contract relatively strongly in 2010.
The length and depth of the current recession will 
depend on how quickly domestic demand recovers 
in CESEE and how large the positive contribution 
of net exports will be. The strength of domestic 
demand will in turn be determined inter alia by 
the success of private debt restructuring, possibly 
including a reduction of the foreign exchange 
exposure of (unhedged) borrowers. Furthermore, 
the willingness of the ﬁ  nancial sector to resume 
lending in CESEE will be an important factor as 
well. Employment and wage developments, which 
in turn depend on the ﬂ  exibility of the CESEE 
economies, will be an important determinant 
of private consumption, whereas investment 
activity will ﬁ  rst and foremost be contingent on 
expectations about future growth. The contribution 
of net exports will largely depend on future 
foreign demand and on the CESEE countries’ 
relative external competitiveness.
Chart 28 GDP growth for 2007-2015
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As regards domestic demand, there is no 
evidence of a re-acceleration of credit growth in 
CESEE yet and the speed with which consumers 
and enterprises manage to restructure their debts 
is difﬁ   cult to gauge. The above-mentioned 
rapid rise in the share of non-performing loans 
certainly suggests that many borrowers are 
experiencing difﬁ  culties in debt servicing. On a 
more positive note, however, it can be argued 
that the nominal exchange rates of most ﬂ  exible 
CESEE currencies have partly recovered from 
their troughs in early 2009. 
Looking at labour markets, unemployment 
increased more or less strongly in all CESEE 
countries (see Chart 29) over the course of 
2009 and wages were on a declining trend in 
most of them (see Chart 30). The most severe 
labour market developments can be observed 
in the Baltic countries, which mirror ongoing 
internal adjustments in the absence of external 
channels of adjustment (i.e. the exchange rate) 
in ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes. It is too early 
to say, however, how strong and persistent the 
increase in unemployment and the deceleration 
of wages will be.
Regarding the prospects for net exports, 
changes in international price competitiveness 
show some differences between developments 
in “ﬁ  xers” and “ﬂ  oaters” (see Chart 31). Real 
effective exchange rates (REERs) of CESEE 
countries with ﬂ  oating exchange rate regimes 
depreciated notably since mid-2008, in line with 
nominal exchange rate depreciations, although 
some of these competitiveness gains have 
been lost in the meantime. The REERs in the 
“ﬁ  xers”, however, continued to appreciate until 
early 2009 and depreciated only slightly since 
then, given the lack of nominal depreciation, 
although adjustment through deﬂ   ation is of 
course an option for these countries.
In a nutshell, after some initial inertia, the 
crisis had a very pronounced effect on real 
economic developments in CESEE starting 
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Chart 30 Wage developments in CESEE
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from late 2008. The length and depth of the 
resulting economic downturn depends partly on 
domestic factors such as the magnitude of the 
non-performing loan problem, banks’ willingness 
to resume lending activity and labour market 
developments. External factors such as the short 
to medium-term global economic prospects and 
the renewed availability of foreign capital will, 
however, obviously play a big role as well.
3.3  THE POLICY RESPONSE SO FAR
The policy response to the crisis in the CESEE 
region focused on three areas: 1) standard 
monetary policy action, in particular changes in 
interest rates, 2) non-standard (monetary) policy 
measures, including liquidity and exchange-rate
supporting measures, and 3) ﬁ  scal  policy. 
In addition, a few CESEE countries obtained 
international ﬁ  nancial assistance. Furthermore, 
the crisis response in the euro area, e.g. the 
standard and non-standard monetary policy 
measures taken by the ECB, had a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the CESEE region as well. First, 
because the euro area is the main trading partner 
for all CESEE countries, and second, because 
the banking systems in CESEE are mostly 
dominated by euro area parent banks, which 
have beneﬁ  ted from ECB measures.
Looking  ﬁ  rst at the standard monetary policy 
measures, widespread inﬂ  ationary  pressure 
characterised the region when it was hit by 
the crisis in September 2008 and most CESEE 
central banks were in an upward interest rate 
cycle. During the ﬁ  rst couple of months after 
the crisis unfolded, central banks thus faced 
difﬁ  cult choices. On the one hand, they needed 
to stimulate demand by lowering interest rates. 
On the other hand, they needed to prevent 
excessive currency depreciation – which 
may have reignited inﬂ  ation – by retaining a 
positive interest rate differential vis-à-vis other 
countries. Therefore, monetary policy remained 
very cautious in most CESEE countries until the 
end of 2008, when the severity of the recession 
became clear. Moreover, in some CESEE 
countries the effectiveness of the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy has been weakened 
by the increase in the spreads between policy 
and market rates, a phenomenon that was 
particularly pronounced in some CESEE 
countries with ﬁ  xed nominal exchange rates. 
In the ﬁ   nal quarter of 2008 most CESEE 
countries with ﬂ   exible exchange rates started 
a process of monetary easing (Hungary after 
a sizeable interest rate hike in October 2008) 
and by end-2009 they had reduced their policy 
rates by between 225 and 525 basis points 
(see Chart 32). At the same time, some CESEE 
central banks intervened verbally (e.g. the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland) and/or through 
market operations (e.g. Romania) to support 
their currencies. Among countries with ﬁ  xed 
(quasi-ﬁ  xed) exchange rates, the central banks 
of Latvia and Croatia have conducted outright 
foreign exchange market interventions to cope 
with downward exchange rate pressures.
Since the outbreak of the ﬁ  nancial crisis CESEE 
central banks and governments have also taken 
a range of non-standard (monetary) policy 
Chart 31 Real effective exchange rate 
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measures to counter the impact of the crisis.39 
Broadly speaking, the aim of these measures 
was to safeguard ﬁ  nancial system stability and 
to avoid (respectively minimise) spillovers from 
adverse  ﬁ   nancial developments to the real 
economy. Most CESEE central banks took 
liquidity-easing measures (e.g. reducing 
domestic reserve requirements, broadening 
eligible collateral and increasing the frequency 
of auctions). Hungary, Poland and Romania also 
used measures to support foreign exchange 
markets including foreign exchange liquidity 
injections and cross-central bank currency swap 
arrangements. More speciﬁ   cally, in the ﬁ  nal 
quarter of 2008, the ECB established agreements 
on repurchase transactions with Hungary and 
Poland in order to provide support to central 
bank operations with a view to euro liquidity 
provision. In addition, some central banks 
signed swap arrangements with Sveriges 
Riksbank (Estonia, Latvia) and Danmarks 
Nationalbank (Latvia). CESEE central banks 
did not, however, undertake any credit or 
quantitative easing measures. In line with EU 
legislation, governments broadened guarantee 
schemes for bank deposits in order to prevent 
bank runs.40 The possibility of state capital 
injections into banks has also been established 
throughout the region, but banks have been 
rather reluctant to draw on that form of relief 
(OeNB, 2009).
Fiscal policy responses to the crisis varied 
across the CESEE region. Generally speaking, 
the ﬁ  scal response was determined by two key 
factors. First, the extent to which public ﬁ  nances 
were already under stress at the beginning 
of the crisis. Second, CESEE countries with 
high external ﬁ   nancing needs needed to take 
account of a possible weakening of investor 
conﬁ  dence which would complicate access to 
foreign funds.41 Whereas the Czech Republic 
and Poland decided on ﬁ  scal stimulus packages 
of around 1% of GDP in 2009 (broadly in line 
with the EU and the euro area average), the net 
impact of ﬁ   scal policy measures in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary is either neutral or even 
deﬁ  cit-reducing.
The strong economic downturn in CESEE put 
additional pressure on general government 
balances in 2009 (see Chart 33), further 
curtailing the room for discretionary ﬁ  scal 
stimuli. Public deﬁ  cits in all CESEE countries 
but Estonia were larger than 3% of GDP in 2009,
in some cases even close to 10% of GDP. 
Consequently, in 2009 public debt levels 
grew strongly throughout CESEE as well, 
but except for Hungary the level remained 
below 60% of GDP. Based on the European 
Commission’s 2010 Spring Forecasts, public 
ﬁ  nances are expected to remain under pressure in 
most CESEE countries also in 2010 and 2011.
See Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for an overview of measures  39 
taken in EU countries and Ishi, Stone and Yehoue (2009) for an 
overview of measures taken in 40 emerging economies.
In accordance with a proposal by the European Commission, all  40 
CESEE EU countries as well as Croatia now guarantee deposits 
up to the equivalent of at least €50,000 and some countries 
implemented an unlimited guarantee.
It should also be noted that most CESEE countries are small open  41 
economies. A strong ﬁ  scal stimulus would thus not only lead to 
higher domestic demand but also to an increase in imports. This 
consideration may have been an additional determinant of the 
ﬁ  scal policy response in some countries.





































Sources: National central banks and OeNB. 
1) Weighted averages of weighted repo rates achieved at regular 
reverse repo auctions of the CNB in the reporting month.39
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In addition to national support measures, 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania have received 
ﬁ   nancial support from the IMF, the EU and 
other international ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
(see Table 3). The size of these Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBAs)  42  amounts to some 
€20 billion for Hungary and Romania (18% and 
14% of 2008 GDP, respectively), and 
€7.5 billion (32% of GDP) for Latvia. In the 
case of Poland the IMF has approved a credit 
line amounting to some €15 billion (5% of 2008 
GDP) under the Flexible Credit Line facility.43 
For Hungary, Latvia and Romania, IFI/EU 
support packages were instrumental in stabilising 
their economies and in sustaining private capital 
ﬂ  ows, but these IFI/EU programmes have also 
helped to support private ﬂ  ows to other CESEE 
countries, although there is no direct evidence 
of such spillover effects.
Finally, in early 2009 the “Vienna initiative” 
was taken to coordinate the response of the 
main public and private stakeholders to the 
ﬁ   nancial crisis in CESEE (EBRD, 2009). 
As part of this initiative, EU-based parent banks 
pledged to reﬁ  nance and, if needed, recapitalise 
their CESEE subsidiaries, home governments 
allowed the parent banks to access national 
banking sector support packages for operations 
at home and abroad, and international ﬁ  nancial 
Following the IMF deﬁ   nition, SBAs are designed to help to  42 
address short-term balance of payments problems, by enabling 
countries to rebuild international reserves, stabilise currencies, 
continue paying for imports and restore conditions for strong 
economic growth, while undertaking policies to correct 
underlying problems.
According to the IMF deﬁ   nition, a Flexible Credit Line is  43 
designed for countries with very strong fundamentals, policies 
and track records of policy implementation and is particularly 
useful for crisis prevention purposes.














































x-axis: budget deficit (percentage of GDP)
y-axis: public debt (percentage of GDP)
Sources: EU Commission – Spring 2010 Forecast and OeNB.
Table 3 IMF lending arrangements in emerging Europe
(in SDR million)
IMF Lending Arrangements in Emerging Europe as of February 28, 2010
Member Date of arrangement Amount agreed Of which drawn
Stand-by Arrangement
Ukraine 5 November 2008 11,000 7,000
Hungary 6 November 2008 10,538 7,637
Latvia 23 December 2008 1,522 892
Serbia 16 January 2009 2,619 1,021
Romania 4 May 2009 11,443 8,263
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 July 2009 1,015 183
Flexible Credit Line
Poland 06 May 2009 13,690 0
Source: IMF.40
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institutions (IFIs) as well as host-country 
governments gave assurances of ﬁ  nancial and 
policy support. Overall, these international 
support measures seem to have helped to calm 
ﬁ  nancial markets and to have contributed to the 
stabilisation of most ﬁ  nancial market segments 
after the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009. In this context, one 
can also mention the EBRD’s “Vienna Initiative 
Plus”, which aims to address the issue of foreign 
exchange exposures, together with other IFIs as 
well as home and host authorities, by ensuring 
conducive macroeconomic policies and 
establishing supporting regulatory frameworks.41
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4   CONCLUSIONS
4 CONCLUSIONS
Before the crisis, the CESEE region was 
experiencing an economic boom with rapid 
GDP and credit growth, which in turn was 
driven by large capital inﬂ   ows and beneﬁ  ted 
from strong global growth and easy global 
liquidity conditions. In addition, strong 
economic growth in the region was supported 
by positive expectations of EU convergence and 
euro adoption.
Up to the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008, CESEE showed 
remarkable resilience to the global economic 
and  ﬁ  nancial crisis. This is partly due to the 
fact that the region had no or only negligible 
exposures to subprime or subprime-related 
assets. Part of this resilience can be explained 
with standard vulnerability indicators as well, 
which at the onset of the crisis indicated in 
several dimensions a strong position of the 
region compared with previous crises. The main 
exceptions were the heightened external and 
banking vulnerabilities, precisely two areas that 
proved to be very sensitive in the context of the 
global crisis.
Since September 2008, the global economic 
and  ﬁ  nancial crisis gained markedly in depth 
and intensity and waning foreign investor 
conﬁ  dence in emerging markets dashed hopes 
of a decoupling of the CESEE countries from 
the global ﬁ   nancial crisis. As a result, the 
CESEE region was hit hard, in many respects 
even harder than other emerging market regions 
such as Latin America. Developments have, 
however, not been homogenous in the region. 
CEE countries tended to be less seriously hit 
than those in the Baltics or in SEE, suggesting 
that the most vulnerable countries tended to be 
most severely affected.
Looking at the impact on different ﬁ  nancial 
market segments, exchange rates were strongly 
affected, stock markets piled up huge losses and 
bond spreads as well as CDS premia increased 
to elevated levels, while becoming more 
volatile. The crisis also had a major impact 
on capital ﬂ   ows to the region, although the 
magnitude of the impact differed again notably, 
depending on the type of capital inﬂ  ows and 
the receiving country. Despite some temporary 
capital outﬂ  ows, the worst-case scenario of a 
fully ﬂ  edged ﬁ  nancial meltdown did not occur. 
In particular, FDI inﬂ   ows and inter-company 
loans played a positive role in stabilising capital 
ﬂ  ows to the region. Banking sectors experienced 
a deceleration in credit and deposit growth, but 
the currency composition of credits and deposits 
hardly changed for the region as a whole. While 
banks in the region have become confronted 
with an – in some countries substantial – 
increase in non-performing loans and a decline 
in proﬁ   tability, banking sector capitalisation 
remained at high levels.
The disruptions in domestic and international 
ﬁ   nancial markets, together with the real 
transmission channels such as the plunge in 
global trade ﬂ  ows, had a pronounced effect on 
real economic developments since late 2008, 
ultimately resulting in severe recessions in most 
countries in the region. Future domestic demand 
will depend inter alia on the success of private 
debt restructuring and the willingness of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector to continue lending. Net exports 
will depend on future foreign demand and 
on CESEE countries’ relative external 
competitiveness. Given the lack of nominal 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility,  the  ﬁ  xed  exchange 
rate countries may ﬁ   nd strengthening their 
competitiveness somewhat more challenging 
than the countries with ﬂ  oating  nominal 
exchange rates. 
The policy response to the crisis focused in the 
CESEE countries on standard and non-standard
monetary policy action, as well as ﬁ  scal 
measures. In countries with ﬂ  exible exchange 
rates, key interest rates were lowered as from the 
end of 2008 when the severity of the recession 
became clear. In most CESEE countries, 
however, policy rates remain at higher levels 
than in major industrialised economies, and 
countries with ﬁ  xed exchange rates tended to 
face a more signiﬁ  cant rise in money market 
rates reﬂ   ecting higher risk premia. Since the 
outbreak of the crisis CESEE authorities have 42
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also taken a range of non-standard monetary 
policy measures to stabilise ﬁ  nancial markets 
and reduce spillovers to the real economy. 
Fiscal policy responses to the crisis varied 
within the region and were mainly determined 
by the ﬁ  scal situation at the beginning of the 
crisis. Overall, the various national and – in 
some cases – international (e.g. IMF, EU) 
support measures appear to have helped to 
cushion the impact of the global economic and 
ﬁ   nancial crisis on the CESEE countries and 
the region’s integration into European banking 
networks turned out to be, on balance, an asset 
during the crisis (although it also played a role 
in fuelling the boom before the crisis). The EU 
anchor also provides a functioning institutional 
and regulatory framework for CESEE countries 
that promotes the convergence process and 
is expected to prevent extreme policy slippages. 43
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Sources: JP Morgan, Moody’s, Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, 
Datastream, Eurostat and OeNB. 
1) JPM EMBIG for Bulgaria.
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Datastream, Eurostat and OeNB.
1) Proxied by JPM EMBIG for Europe.
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1) Proxied by JPM EMBIG for Europe.
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1) Proxied by JPM EMBIG for Europe.
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Sources: JP Morgan, Moody’s, Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, 
Datastream, Eurostat and OeNB. 
1) JPM EMBIG for Hungary.
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1) Proxied by JPM EMBIG for Europe.
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Sources: JP Morgan, Moody’s, Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, 
Datastream, Eurostat and OeNB. 
1) JPM EMBIG for Poland.
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